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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK DAVID LEWIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920472-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a conviction for the offense of "Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol," Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended), a Class B Misdemeanor, in the Fourth 
Circuit Court of the State of Utah, the Honorable Lynn W. Davis, 
presiding. 
CLEVE J. HATCH 
Public Defenders 
60 East, 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Appellant 
BENJAMIN T. DAVIS 
County Attorney's Office 
100 E. Center St., #2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Attorney for Appellee 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARK DAVID LEWIS, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 920472-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as 
amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I. Whether comments made by the trial court instructing the 
prosecution as to how it should proceed and as to the credibility 
and weight to be given the testimony of a prosection witness 
deprives the defendant of a fair trial and thus constitutes 
reversible error. 
II. Whether the failure of the prosecution to identify the 
defendant in its case in chief constitutes reversible error. 
III. Whether the trial court should have recused itself for 
prejudice upon motion by the defense. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal of a criminal case for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol (DUI). The case comes before the Utah Court 
of Appeals after defendant Mark David Lewis was convicted at trial 
and judgement was entered thereon. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
On 21 October, 1991, Mark David Lewis, in a rural area 
unfamiliar to him, drove his vehicle onto what he believed 
(according to signage and poor lighting), was a freeway on-ramp. 
Mr. Lewis' vehicle went off-road and became immobile on railroad 
tracks. (T. at 10.) During his efforts to free his vehicle, police 
personnel arrived at the scene to investigate. (T. at 9.) After 
Mr. Lewis informed the police that he nearly had the vehicle free, 
the officers remained at the scene to ensure no assistance was 
necessary. (T. at 13.) Subsequently, upon noting that a passenger 
in the vehicle was intoxicated, (T. at 11,) the officer began to 
administer a field sobriety test (FST) to Mr. Lewis. (T. at 15-22.)-
Although the facts as to how well Mr. Lewis performed on the FST 
are controverted, the officer arrested Mr. Lewis for DUI. (T. at 
22.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
At trial, the court committed a significant error by first 
instructing the prosecutor as to how to argue his case, and 
immediately thereafter informing the prosecutor that the testimony 
of a particular witness for the prosecution should have been given 
more weight and credibility than the prosecutor had acknowledged. 
(T. at 57 et. seq.) 
Later in the trial, after the prosecution had rested and the 
defense was beginning its case in chief, the defense moved for 
dismissal on the ground that the prosecution had failed to produce 
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evidence identifying Mr. Lewis as the defendant. (T. at 76.) 
Rather than grant the motion, the court forestalled the defense by 
allowing the prosecution to re-open its case in chief to recall a 
witness in order to identify Mr. Lewis as the defendant. (T. at 96-
97.) As to the motive for the court's ruling, the defense believes 
it results from prejudice on the part of the trial court as against 
Mr. Lewis. Such prejudice is reflected in the comments of the 
court directed at the prosecution which are mentioned above. A 
motion was made that the court recuse itself for such prejudice, 
but again the motion for the defense was denied. (T. at 64-65.) 
ARGUMENT I, 
IMPROPER JUDICIAL COMMENT. 
In Meier v. Christensen, 389 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah, 1964), the 
Utah Supreme Court said "trial courts should be careful not to 
comment or express opinions on the evidence." In another case from 
the Utah Supreme Court, Fox v. Taylor, 350 P. 2d 154, 157 (Utah, 
1960) , the state high Court said "[w]e recognize the duty of the 
court under our law to avoid comments on the evidence; or which may 
tend to indicate an opinion as to what the facts are on disputed 
issues." (See also; Ortega v. Thomasr 383 P.2d 406 (Utah, 1963); 
Federated Milk Producers' Assoc, Inc. v. Statewide Plumbing & 
Heating Co. , 358 P.2d 348 (Utah, 1961), both recognizing the 
impropriety of comments as to evidence by trial court judge.) 
During the trial of the case here on appeal, the trial judge, 
in response to the prosecutor's remarks and what the court 
apparently thought was a lack of necessary fervor, told the 
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prosecutor to "be an advocate," and went on to express the court's 
opinion as to the experience of a police officer witness and the 
resulting weight that should thus attach to his testimony. The 
court said 
why can't an officer, based upon his seventeen years of 
experience, make a determination whether somebody passed 
or failed [a field sobriety test]? He can state in his 
opinion whether or not he passed or failed, based upon 
seventeen years of experience and hundreds of cases. 
Don't defeat his own ability to make those judgements and 
have that opinion. (T. at 57-58.) 
This is obviously an attempt by the court to instruct the 
prosecution as to its procedure and handling of its case. Such 
instruction is not only unwarranted, but more importantly works 
against the adversarial system wherein the court is to remain 
absolutely neutral as to the parties. 
As such, the comments of the court as to how the prosecutor should 
proceed and the quality of the witness's testimony are sufficient 
for reversal of the trial court's judgement upon the conviction. 
ARGUMENT II, 
FAILURE OF PROSECUTION TO IDENTIFY DEFENDANT. 
Nowhere in the prosecution's case in chief did it produce 
evidence showing that Mark David Lewis was in fact the individual 
at the scene of incident of October 21. That is, the only point at 
which the prosecution introduced such identification testimony was 
after a Dismissal Motion made by defense counsel for failing to 
identify the defendant, which motion was made after the prosecution 
had rested. (Transcript at 76.) It was at that point in the 
proceeding when the court allowed the prosecution to re-open its 
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case and recall a wi tness to i dentify Mark David Lewis as the 
individual ^ the scene of the arrest. (Transcript ^^ 96, 97, 
1 ) 
In Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P. 2d 1 336 (Utah, 1986), the U tali 
Supreme Court stated, "i n a criminal prosecution every element of 
the offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.11 I Citing 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, § ; 6 :i -50J (J ) ) Iemphasis added ) . In 
State M Sorensoii. \ I '"I -In 468 (I It- it i\|-" ' "'Ji H 8 |
 l( t h i s <'" f 
said "[d]ue process requires the prosecution prove beyor 
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to - ;n^t • r.ute the crime 
c -har ge< i. " (Citing In Re Winshio 3 9 / I J f; i' (] 9 ; : )) 
Having failed i n i ts case i n eh i ef to identify Mr. Lewis as 
the defendant rid then being a] lowed to re-open i ts case aftep 
commencemer t le ciefei: lse, r esu] ted ii i i pi: eji id :ii ce be Mr I ewi s , 
Such prejudice should be considered in 1 :i ght of the prejudice 
allege . lefensf t c f til le tr i a] zonz t ji i :ige 
considered Argumei
 : . < * "he defense believes that but 
for such ore-uoice, defense's Motion to Dismiss for failure to so 
i iif n t . i«y i n I I I II H i I I II III I i i ! 1 1 in m i l i- d . 
ARGUMENT III. 
JUDICIAL PREJUDICE, FAILURE TO RECUSE. 
Al t i: I  ill i uui'i.M I In HI I h I n te i iM- nnisiiMj f I IH i m n t I i PI use 
itself for prejudice. (T. at 64-65, et. seq.) 
In State v. Gardner, 78 9 P,;d ; m , " \B illtah, 1939), the Utah 
Supreme Co ' " ' fendan). dues nut .ulleqe any dctual bias but 
argues that judge should recuse himself where there L an 
appearance of bias. We agree." The Court went on to say 
[i]f the allegations in the affidavit are true and they 
would give a reasonable person cause to doubt whether the 
judge could be impartial under the circumstances, he 
should recuse himself. Nothing is more damaging to the 
public confidence in the legal system than the appearance 
of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge." (Id.) 
As to whether a case should be reversed for error due to 
judicial prejudice, the test is "whether *there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant./fl (Id., 
citing State v. Hutchinson, 655 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah, 1982)). 
This Court should recognize that absent such prejudice on the 
part of the trial court, such prejudice evidenced by comments made 
at trial favoring the prosecution and its witnesses, it is likely 
it would not have allowed the state to re-open its case after 
resting and subsequent to the opening of the defense in order to 
introduce evidence regarding the identity of the defendant, a fact 
obviously necessary for conviction. Had the Court not allowed the 
prosecution such wide latitude, it likely would have had to dismiss 
the case upon motion made by the defense. (Trial record at 76.) It 
is clear that there is a reasonable likelihood that a more 
favorable result for Mr. Lewis would have occurred were it not for 
the prejudice displayed by the trial court. 
In State v. Neeleyr 748 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah, 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court referred to Utah Code Annotated 77-35-29 and the Utah 
Code of Judicial Conduct 3(c)(1)(b) (1981) when it said 
it has been suggested that a trial judge disqualify 
himself whenever an affidavit of bias and prejudice is 
filed against him in good faith . . . (citing State v. 
Byinaton. 200 P.2d 723 (Utah, 1948)). There the Court 
went on to say ". . .a judge should recuse himself when 
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his impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . 
this standard set forth by the Code of Judicial Conduct 
should be given careful consideration by the trial judge. 
It may require recusal in instances where no actual bias 
is shown. Failure to observe it may subject the judge to 
disciplinary measures . . . " 
. . . [W]e recommend the practice that a judge recuse himself 
where there is a colorable claim of bias or prejudice . . ." 
Neeley, 748 P.2d at 1094. 
Although in this case prejudice by the court was clear, 
Byington and Neeley clarify the attitude of the Utah Supreme Court 
on the mere appearance of prejudice. Had the trial court 
recognized its prejudice against Mr. Lewis and appropriately 
recused itself, it is probable that Mr. Lewis would have had his 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Identify granted. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in making improper comments as to how 
the prosecution should conduct its case and as to the weight to be 
given to the statements of its witness. Such err was recognized by 
the defense. The court further erred in failing to recuse itself 
for prejudice when so moved by the defense. The result of that 
prejudice was the court's allowance of the prosecution to re-open 
its case to identify Mr. Lewis after the defense had commenced its 
case in chief. Such error resulted in a failure of the judicial 
system to deal fairly with Mr. Lewis at his trial. Accordingly, 
defense counsel respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
judgement of the trial court and dismiss the case with prejudice. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of February, 1993. 
v /, 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK DAVID LEWIS, 
Defendant. 
ADDENDUM TO BREIF 
Case No. 920472-CA 
Comes now the Defendant, Mark David Lewis, by and through his 
attorney of record, Cleve J. Hatch, and does hereby susbmit the 
following Addendum to Brief. 
Dated this />2 day of February, 1993. 
Cleve J^Hatchf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Addendum to Brief, postage prepaid, to Ben Davis, 100 East 
Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606, and to Utah Court of Appeals, 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / ^ 
day of February, 1993. 
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LEWIS, MARK DAVID CASE NO: 925001121 PAGE 2 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Chrg: DUI Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Ju 
Fine Amount: 1000.00 Suspended: 400.00 
Jail: 180 DAYS Suspended: 178 DAYS 
LWD/THE JURY HAVING FOUND DEFENDANT GUILTY AND DEFENDANT HAVING 
WAIVED SENTENCING DEFENDANT IS FINED $1000/$600 SUSP TO BE TAKEN 
FROM BAIL POSTED. DEFENDNAT IS TO SERVE 2 DAYS (LESS 5 HRS 
CREDITED FOR TIME ALREADY SERVED) TO BE SERVED IN THE UTAH CO. 
JAIL ON WEEKENDS OR DAYS OFF BY 8/23/92. DEFENDANT IS ORDERED 
TO HAVE AN ALCOHOL EVALUATION (IF DONE IN UTAH COUNTY IT MAY BE 
PAID FOR FROM THE TRUST FUND. DEFENSE COUNSEL MOVED TO STAY 
EXECUTION ON FINE/JAIL. HE IS ORDERED TO FILE SUCH MOTIONS 
WITH THE COURT ALONG WITH APPROPRIATE AFFIDAVITS. CC: UTAH 
COUNTY JAIL AND UTAH COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE. 
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BURDEN OF PROOF 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Els 
ment of the offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is pra 
sumed to be innocent until each element of the OB 
fense charged against him is proved beyond a reasoffl 
able doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendara 
shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of th« 
offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, ofl 
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or fori 
bidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are npj 
elements of the offense but shall be established by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 1973 
76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation ofl 
proof — When not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a de-
fense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indict! 
ment, or other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a 
result of evidence presented at trial, either 
by the prosecution or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense; 
and the defendant has presented evidence 0: 
such affirmative defense. 197; 
76-1-503. Presumption of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this 
code or other penal statute has the following conse« 
quences: 
A Judge Should Perform the Duties of the Office 
Impartially and Diligently. 
"he judicial duties of a full-time judge take precedence over all other activi-
i. These judicial duties include all the duties of the office prescribed by law. 
the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: 
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it. A judge should be unswayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings 
before the court. 
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others who come before the court or 
the judge in the judge's official capacity, and should require similar 
conduct of lawyers, and of staff, court officials, and others subject to 
judicial direction and control. 
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested 
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, 
and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex 
parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding. A judge may communicate with court staff and/or other 
judges about issues in a case without engaging in inappropriate ex 
parte communication provided that the judge does not abrogate the 
responsibility to personally decide the case pending before the court. 
A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on 
the law applicable to a proceeding before the court if the judge gives 
notice to the parties of the person consulted and the substance of the 
advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond. 
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court. 
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending 
or impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to judicial direction 
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making 
public statements in the course of their official duties or from ex-
plaining for public information the procedures of the court. 
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, or recording 
in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during ses-
sions of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may 
authorize: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presen-
tation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other, 
purposes of judicial administration; or 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of 
investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings. 
(8) A judge should prohibit taking photographs (including motion 
picture and videotape) in the courtroom and areas immediately adja-
cent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, 
except that still photographs of the judge and other court personnel, 
urt shall specifically forbid the taking of any photographs where it 
ids a substantial likelihood that such activity would jeopardize a 
ir hearing or trial in the matter at issue. 
Administrative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibil-
es, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, 
id facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities 
other judges and court officials. 
(2) A judge should require staff and court officials subject to judi-
il direction and control to observe the relevant ethical standards of 
lelity and diligence. 
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary mea-
res against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which 
e judge may become aware. However, this provision shall not apply 
information which is generated and communicated under the poli-
»s of the Judicial Performance Evaluation Program. 
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments and should 
ercise the power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoid-
g nepotism and favoritism. A judge should not approve compensa-
m of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
Disqualification. 
(1) Disqualification must be entered in a proceeding by any judge 
tiose impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but 
>t limited to instances where: 
(a) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, or 
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; 
(b) The judge had served as lawyer in the matter in contro-
versy, had practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the 
matter at the time of their association, or the judge or such law-
yer has been a material witness concerning it; 
(c) The judge knows of a financial interest, including fiduciary 
interest, of either the judge personally or the judge's spouse 
and/or minor children residing in the household, in the subject 
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any 
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome 
of the proceeding; 
(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within the third degree of 
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 
trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could 
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material 
witness in the proceeding. 
(2) A judge should be informed about personal and fiduciary finan-
al interests, and make a reasonable effort to be informed about the 
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